The Canadian Search For Identity, 1846-1914
Communication In An Imperial Context -

(The first of four articles)
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In the seventy years which preceded the First World War Canadians struggled to create a common identity acceptable across their ethnic, religious and regional diversities. The conflicts which developed in this struggle centered around alternative visions of Canada's destiny which were typified by the emphases on empire, statehood, regional differences or American assimilation and which were translated into a number of specific concerns. One of these concerns related to the communications technologies which were introduced into Canada between 1846 and 1914. These technologies were interpreted by Canadians as having specific implications for the furtherance of their political aspirations. This essay will discuss the imperial context for these aspirations.

Canadians were not, of course, of a single mind in their interpretations of technological innovation or its implications. But there were broad rubrics of meaning within which dialogues were constructed by Canadians who addressed specific historical concerns. These contexts are important, not only because they are necessary for any meaningful post facto generalizations to be drawn about the period, but also because the contexts appear to be ones which still serve to influence Canadian opinions about what is important and meaningful in the discussion of proposed technological innovations in communications systems.

The attempts of Canadians to pull together a vast land area into a viable political entity have been circumscribed historically by their ability to harness communication and commerce. The problem which has confronted Canadians whose political and economic visions have extended across the whole of the North American continent has been one of distance. In one sense this Canadian problem has been simply the larger imperial problem in microcosm, for in both cases the central dialectic which has served to control the fulfillment of aspirations has been that created by the opposing frontiers of influence has been an expansive one, the frontier of sovereignty has served in a delimiting capacity. In both contexts, the Canadian and the imperial, men of vision have pushed the influence of their political state outward, straining it to the breaking point, only to find that the extension of sovereign authority lagged behind and defeated their presumptiveness.

The British and Canadian peoples have attempted to deal with this problem by drawing desirable areas of the globe into commercial orbits and by thrusting their sovereignty outward by utilizing communications technologies to compensate for an otherwise-lacking physical presence. In Canada such strategies were sometimes halted by aboriginal peoples who, whether operating from intuitive notions of the assumed presence afforded by the telegraph to their adversaries or not, refused to allow its installation or operation on their land without a signed treaty. In contrast, too, to the American experience in which territory was staked out by advancing frontiersmen acting alone, the Canadian land mass was conquered "by advancing armies and police forces, large corporate enterprises and ecclesiastical organizations, supported by the state." The role of the Hudson's Bay Company in Canada is well known. Of no less importance to Canada's destiny were organizations such as the Montreal Telegraph Company, Bell Canada and the Canadian Pacific Railway.

Throughout the last half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth there was a nearly continuous debate in progress between the apologists for imperialism on the one hand and the detractors of it on the other. Although the appeal of imperialism may have been effectively destroyed by the First World War, the debate over the merits of British imperial strategy--or lack of it--has continued, albeit at a less frantic pace. One conclusion, however, which has been shared by both groups participating in this controversy is that, "European overseas imperialism was a cultural force of a magnitude and speed which has never been matched in history ... Historically, ... European overseas imperialism is one of the most significant occurrences in the modern era." The published writings of the supporters and detractors of British imperialism during this seventy-year period are numerous. Also, the uses of the word "imperialism" promulgated by these authors are many and varied in their emphases. But, for the
most part, these works are devoid of discussion concerning any relationship between imperialism and communication. This should not imply that communication and communication technologies were unimportant to these writers, but that the concerns only become apparent at a different level of analysis. At the theoretical level, communication has not been discussed extensively by those concerned with imperialism, while at the practical level it has been a major concern. In other words, communication has become important to such writers only when the discussion has turned to questions of operationalizing “imperial sentiment.”

That communication was important to the British empire should be apparent to anyone who examines a map of the world as it existed at the turn of the century or on the eve of the First World War. British territories, colored red by cartographers, existed in every part of the world and were separated by vast distances of both land and water. In order for the British to pursue any sort of imperial policy effectively, it was crucial that some system of communication be developed. But it never seemed to be developed quickly or thoroughly enough. Seymour Cheng has noted the various writers who pointed out cases in which imperial interest suffered due to lack of central authority; his point has been emphasized by Robert A. Huttenback. The literature which points to a lack of clear policy direction for imperial expansion or the administration of acquired territories is extensive.

The discrepancy which developed between the reality of Britain’s efforts in imperial conquest and the manner in which this conquest was explained by imperial apologists is striking. This is true for two reasons. First there was the tendency of those in power to take credit for any political accomplishment, particularly after such exploits had been romanticized by writers such as Dilke and Froude. Second, it only made sense to assume that a major world power such as Great Britain would be in charge of her own destiny, a claim made, for instance, by Gallagher and Robinson.

But this brings us to the concern for communications technologies. Given the state of communication at mid-century, it is easy to see why “men on the spot” could operate without central direction. And in spite of all the improvements in communications technology throughout the century, these men continued to control, in greater or lesser degree, what Harold A. Innis has called “a monopoly of knowledge.” Innis has contended that, “The effective government of large areas depends to a very great extent on the efficiency of communication.” That Great Britain had a large area to govern during this period is beyond dispute. But as for the efficiency of communication, there was great variation throughout the century. For instance, any imperial administrators remained isolated functionaries for most of the nineteenth century. This was particularly true of those located on small and distant island territories, or those separated from England by vast land masses, as were the factors of the Hudson’s Bay Company during their tenure as lords of the Canadian west.

Throughout the period 1846-1914 the British were leaders in the development of communications technologies, a forseeable fact given Britain’s historic stress on communications. The technological developments nurtured by Britain probably grew from her recognition of the vast and scattered territory she was compelled to govern, as well as the knowledge that any colonial governor, or even any minor bureaucratic official in the antipodes, could effectively present his superior with a fait accompli in deserting or acquiring territory, suppressing a rebellion, confiscating a ship’s cargo, or committing a thousand other acts which might compromise the home government.

But Great Britain did encourage technological innovations in communications. Partly due to her efforts, the technical accomplishments of the last half of the nineteenth century, and particularly of the period after 1870, were profuse and significant. But what were the effects of the new communications technologies on the administration of empire?

First, they were frightening to the non-European peoples who saw them in action. Betts has argued that, “There was a daemonic [sic] quality about the steam engine, the telegraph, the machine gun, which suggested a spiritual as well as a technological superiority.” It was significant, too, that Betts’s choice of inventions equated the demonic quality of the telegraph with that of the machine gun for each in its own way was terrible in its devastation. Betts concluded, too, that, “The dynamism of the West, of which technological innovation is perhaps the most striking characteristic, stood in sharp contrast to the staticism of other cultures.”

It can be argued, too, that it was not the technologies, per se, which were truly
demonic, but that these were but the manifestation of a far more sinister fact—the
technique which underlay their development. The West's dynamism, counterposed in
sharp relief against the cultural staticism with which it was constantly interacting,
the efficiency which that dynamism represented, and the philosophically racist under-
pinnings of that drive for efficiency, were more ultimate in their effects than
their mechanical and electrical creations which seemed to contemporary observers to
have such powerful impacts. This, it can be argued, was equally as true in British
North America, where the attitudes engendered by British dynamism in this period con-
flicted with French Canadian conservative religious beliefs and cultural traditions,
as it was in southern Africa or Tasmania, where the aboriginal population had been
obliterated by the dawn of the twentieth century. The response to the telegraph of
Canada's own aborigines has already been mentioned.

But communications technologies, in addition to possessing an awe-inspiring
quality, were also seen as essential to binding together the empire. G.R. Parkin in
1905 observed that, "For a people scattered as is our British race in all quarters of
the globe, and yet aspiring to closer commercial intercourse, to complete political
unity and yet giving mutual support, rapidity, ease, and cheapness of communica-
tions are of the very essence of our needs." Hyam concluded that British dominion "relia-
ted mainly on accorded tenets of character, on superiority of arms, on skillful administra-
tion, on racial arrogance, and on a global communications network." Both J. Henniker
Heaton in 1890 and George Peel in 1905 called telegraph cables "The Nerves of Empire."

The necessity for improved communication was subject to continual debate throughout
the period. Even as early as 1838 the Annual Register had concluded that the speed
and certainty of communication made possible by regular steamship crossings had made
colonial representation possible at Westminster. In 1871 it was claimed that the
Antipodes "were almost as near to London as for years California was to Washington.
Even Australia was being brought near enough to present no difficulty in the way of
federation.

In spite of the difficulties encountered in the extension and usage of new commu-
nications technologies—which, for the most part, were ignored by those enamored
by the new possibilities they opened—many spokesmen of the period heralded the new
age created by electrical and steam technologies. W.E. Forster in 1876 claimed
that steamers and ocean cables enabled Britain to "laugh at distance." While J.A.
Froude in 1886 contended that, "Steam and telegraph have made an end of distance." In
1914 a Royal Commission contended that science was continuing to annihilate
distance.

The desire for even better communication within the empire was made apparent at
both the 1907 and 1911 Imperial Conferences, and by Rodolphe Lemieux, Postmaster-
General of Canada, who argued before the Canadian House of Commons on July 18, 1911,
that, "I think that if you wish to forge the bonds of union among the different parts
of the empire, you must have cheap electric communication so as to make the centre of
the empire the nerve centre of the imperial organizations." These sentiments were
echoed by Stuart-Linton in 1912.

It is apparent from such comments that new communications technologies were being
looked to as the means to make a united empire a practical reality. Many of the
advocates of imperial federation schemes probably failed to recognize the limitations
of the technologies which they depended upon to advocate their positions, however,"
as did many colonials who also depended too readily on immature or undependable
communications marvels to put them into closer harmony with London. The advocates wanted
desperately in many cases to agree with a 1914 Royal Commission Report which contended
that, "Cable communication tends to quicken the pulse of nationality and forms an
effective supplement to the broader, though slower, interchange of thought and senti-
ment by means of postal communication. It reinforces the feeling of joint life in a
manner not possible by correspondence when two months are required for a reply to
any letter."

Canada was an important participant in the on-going debate over imperial communica-
sions systems during this period. She was one of the British dominions which were
moving slowly toward complete self-government and which, as Knaplund has observed,
were "irked by anything that savored of dictation by the mother country." Disagree-
ments between Canada and Great Britain during this sixty-eight year period included
the issues of colonial contributions toward imperial defense, methods of dealing with
the United States, the Boer War and the construction of the Pacific cable."
The Canadian attitude toward the empire, and toward the importance of communication within it, were crucial ones. Canadians saw the Canadian Pacific Railway, for instance, as an imperial project, and one of the men most closely associated with the C.P.R. project, Sir Sandford Fleming, also originated the idea of the Pacific cable. The support of Canada was also solicited by Great Britain on controversial issues, as it was by Chamberlain in 1902 when Britain desired to have the colonies contribute to the a single imperial navy, support for which was denied by Laurier. The other British colonies also courted Canada's favor for their own imperial schemes, and emulated her, particularly following the 1867 Confederation which created the Canadian national state.

Although Britain tended to view Canada nostalgically, particularly after the loss of the remainder of North America to the rebellious Americans, and saw the Canadians as possessing an undying loyalty to the empire, Canada never seemed quite sure of her importance in the imperial context. Throughout the period Canadians complained about their treatment by Britain whenever there were conflicts between herself and the United States. Somehow Great Britain always seemed to Canadians eager to compromise their interests in favor of bettered relations with America. Many Canadians relished the identity promulgated by talk of empire, finding a Canadian identity not sufficiently satisfying, yet many were all-too-conscious of attitudes similar to those expressed by the Edinburgh Review as early as 1825 and 1826 that Canada was an unprofitable burden on the empire, bound to eventually join the Republic, and that the bond between Britain and Canada ought to be dissolved. Still loyalists insisted that Canada could only continue to exist so long as Britain stood with her, although "the customary attitude of Canadian Imperialists to England was a curious mixture of affection and anxiety, resentment and solicitude. Charges that Canadian interest had been sacrificed by British diplomacy, quick and indignant responses to manifestations of superciliousness, and apprehensive warnings that the insularity and narrowness of Englishmen were jeopardizing the Empire, ran all through imperialist thought.

In 1849 a group of Montreal businessmen moved for annexation to the United States via a manifesto to the Governor General. This action followed an April open letter to Lord Elgin, Governor of Canada, who had agreed to the rebellion Losses Bill compensating the convicted rebels of the 1837-38 uprising for losses they had incurred. This letter had both implied that the British compensatory action had disgusted the British Canadian population by its dishonorable policy and impugned Elgin's dignity. Charles Tupper in 1860 argued that the colonies of Canada were "destitute of all influence with the Imperial Government..." and cited the British Cabinet's refusal to seriously consider support for the Inter-Colonial Railway scheme for which a joint Canadian delegation had solicited assistance in London in 1858. Tupper also complained about Britain's refusal to intervene to assist Nova Scotia and New Brunswick which were in financial straits due to railroad construction, and charged that the Canadians were forever in a position of uncertainty, subject to the ever-changing orders of the "occupants of Downing Street." Britain also failed to respond to the Canadians' requests for assistance to construct a telegraphic link across Canada as a "vital part of the 'all red route' which was to bind together the far-flung Empire..." received no assistance from Britain and in 1864 Canadian politician J. Brown, who visited England on behalf of the Canadian Ministry, concluded that the British expected the Canadian to soon "shift for themselves," and observation which was affirmed by the Canadian statesman Galt in 1867 when he was visiting London.

To Canadians, Britishers must have seemed infected by the rhetoric of men such as Cobden, who in 1865 refused to see any substantial interests of Britain being served by connection with Canada. Canadian fears of British intentions were confirmed by the 1869 notification by Britain "of its intention to begin the gradual withdrawal of the regular forces from the country," an intention carried through by 1871, as well as by other British actions which the Canadians viewed as being selfish and short-sighted.

In 1870-71 the British attitude seemed to be "merely the ethical one of abandoning
the Dominion in a decent, dignified way," while the Canadians were viewed as beginning to see the risks inherent with connection to Britain. By 1872 J.H. Gray was observing that the Canadian allegiance to the British government was being viewed by the imperial authorities as voluntary, and the connection nominal, although two years later Lord Dufferin was claiming that Canada's sympathy of purpose and unity of interest had never been more identical to that of the mother country and that Canada was never "more ready to accept whatever obligations may be imposed upon her by a partnership in the future fortunes of the Empire." By 1897 Canada was being courted "as never before" by Joseph Chamberlain, "the arch-priest of the new imperialism," and as the London Daily Mail put it, "With Canada's lead, we stand at the threshold of a new epoch in the history of the Empire." In 1898 Canada issued a 2-cent postage stamp bearing "a world map in Mercator projection with British territories in bold crimson, inscribed 'We hold a vaster empire than has been...'." The hopes of the Canadians seemed to bear fruit, too, for as a result of Canada's lead, the empire was launched near the turn of the century on a preferential tariff policy, which replaced the previously negotiated most-favored-nation clauses which were in effect with Germany and Belgium. Beginning in 1900 also, British capital began flowing steadily into Canada, capital which was used on railroad projects, industrial plants and municipal construction.

By 1905 Morgan and Burpee reported that the blatant ignorance of the British people concerning Canada was being corrected by the British press which was giving an increasing amount of attention to Canadian affairs and taking pains to make sure that its information about Canada was accurate. In 1908 Milner claimed that there was a necessary connection between Canadian and imperial patriotism, and in 1911 Sir Charles Tupper, who fifty years earlier had been so disgruntled with British attitudes toward Canada, remarked that, "No person can attach more importance than I do to the position at which Canada has now arrived--a position which will render this Empire the bulwark of the throne and British institutions, a greater Empire than the world has ever seen.

As World War I approached, Lord Milner voiced a long-standing Canadian complaint, however, that Canada was still suffering from "very imperfect means of communication by steamer between Great Britain and these Maritime Provinces." And while Thomas W. Wilby was bragging that the Maritime Provinces were unsurpassed in the Empire in their loyalty to the imperial idea, there is doubt that such loyalty was of much assistance to an empire which was grappling with an increasingly dangerous European situation about which Canadians were by-and-large oblivious. It was as though Canadians, who were tied up in the process of trying to make sense of their complex imperial, national and regional identities, were unable to take the time to recognize that their world was about to crash about their heads. In many ways they were as isolated from political reality as were the Americans to their south, only they were to be involved in the world conflagration much sooner.

So far as Canadian attitudes toward the empire were concerned, it would seem that they saw the empire as consistently more important than it was even to Britain herself. Perhaps that was because the Canadians had learned through the result of many quarrels with the young giant to her south--quarrels in which Great Britain was usually involved--not to take anything for granted. With the imperial sentiment of Canadians were bound, too, notions of imperial communications requirements. Canadians saw the necessity of binding together the far-flung empire with communications networks which would serve to protect the relatively weak colonial states from voracious powers such as the United States, a nation with which the Canadians were in nearly constant contention.

Canadian visions of imperialism, then, were much different than those of theorists of imperialism--contemporary or latter day--who seemed more concerned with economic questions than with the day-to-day concerns with which Canadians were confronted. The Canadian vision--myopic as it might have been--was tempered by conflict and not theory, and was one which eagerly accepted one scheme for improved communication after another within the context of a unified empire. And finally, given the necessity to counter American moves across the continent, the Canadians appreciated the problem of the "man on the spot," and sought to relieve him of his burden by building their own transcontinental and imperial communications system.
1. This was true, for instance, of much of the discussion at the Nineteenth Canadian-American Seminar at Windsor University, "Accountability and Responsibility in North American Communications Systems: Future Perspectives," November 10, 11, 1977.


3. An excellent discussion of this problem as it relates to Australia is Geoffrey Blainey's The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's History, Illustrated Edition, Macmillan Co. of Australia Ltd. 1966.


15. Dilke, Greater Britain; see also McIntyre, Imperial Frontier, P. 10; and Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism, p. 199.


24. Macdonald has related an incident in northwest Canada in which Indians who had threatened a telegraph line-stringing party were frightened off by a rapidly-arriving band of militia whom they thought had been transported through the wires: "they believed that by some superhuman agency the soldiers had been transported over the telegraph line during the night and they decided that it was hopeless to oppose such magic." John Stuart Macdonald, "The Dominion Telegraph," Chapters in the North-West Historical Society Publications, vol. 1, no. 6, 1930, p. 17.


29. John Henniker Heaton, "A Penny Post for the Empire," The Nineteenth Century (June 1890), p. 918; George Peel, "The Nerves of Empire," The Empire, Edited by Goldman, pp. 249-287. Results of the extension of communications in the empire are outlined by Kiewiet, Imperial Factor, pp. 292, 293;


31. Hyam, Imperial Century, p. 32.


33. See Hyam, Imperial Century, p. 58.

34. Quoted in Stuart-Linton, Empire Governance, p. 57.


37. Bets, Europe Overseas, p. 192.

38. Canada, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), vol. 102, 11th Parliament, 3d Session, 1911, col. 9643.


41. Bodelson, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism, p. 173; see also Cheng, Federation, p. 85.


48. See Imperial Conference, 1911.

49. See Baldwin, Governance of Empire, p. 205.


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In an article "The Politics of Canadian Space Programs" published in our Spring 1979 issue, footnote 20 stated:

"Frank W. Peers, 'Canadian Media Regulation,' in Gertrude et al. (ed.) Studies in Canadian Communication, Canada: McGill University, 1975, p. 79."

This should have read: "Gertrude Robinson" instead of just Gertrude. G.G. Robinson is a professor at McGill University and has written several books. Our attention was drawn to the error by Eileen Foster, Librarian at Telesat Canada.