Political Marketing Canadian Style?
The Conservative Party and the 2006 Federal Election

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Abstract: This study investigates the change in Conservative Party behaviour during the 18 months between the 2004 and 2006 Canadian federal elections. It asks: How did the Conservative Party strategy influence the shift in voter preference during the 2006 Canadian federal election? The approach taken to address this question is rooted in the emerging field of Political Marketing. Using the Lees-Marshment taxonomy of party behaviour as a framework for analyzing the election outcome, this paper demonstrates how market intelligence was incorporated into the Conservative Party’s strategy to influence voter perceptions.

Keywords: Political communication; Marketing; Public relations

Introduction
In October 2003 the Canadian Alliance Party (CAP) and the Progressive Conservative Party (PCP) merged into the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC). Five months later, in March 2004, Stephen Harper, the former leader of the CAP was chosen to lead the new national party. Some three months after that, on
June 28, 2004, Canada’s 38th general election took place. In contrast to the initial expectations of many commentators, the 2004 election proved to be a closely contested affair between the newly formed CPC and the governing Liberals. The outcome of the election saw the Liberal Party re-elected to power but losing its parliamentary majority in the wake of a $100-million Liberal sponsorship scandal, or Adscam, revealed in the annual report of the Auditor General, Sheila Fraser, earlier in the year.

While the total number of seats in the House of Commons won by the Conservatives in 2004 grew from 78 to 99, the new party’s share of the popular vote fell to 29.6% from the 37.7% that had been jointly obtained by the CAP and PCP in 2000 (Elections Canada, 2007). The decline in popular support for the Conservatives in 2004 was linked to the Canadian public’s apprehension about the new party and its leader, and to a Liberal Party public communication campaign that successfully played upon this apprehension. The campaign portrayed the CPC and its leader as untrustworthy and harbouring a hidden right-wing agenda oriented toward curtailing public services and fostering closer ties with the Bush Administration (Clarke, Kornberg, MacLeod, & Scotto, 2005; Rose, 2004).

In January 2006, Canadians returned to the polls. Despite the fact that many of the central issues in the 2006 election echoed those of the 2004 campaign (Clarke et al., 2005; Clarke, Kornberg, Scotto, & Twyman, 2006), this time the Conservatives’ share of the popular vote grew by approximately 7% to 36.3%, and the CPC was elected to power as a minority government (Elections Canada, 2007). This victory suggests that in the 18 months between the two federal elections, the CPC managed to successfully reconfigure itself and its political communication strategy in a manner that enhanced its appeal to the Canadian electorate.

A central communication question that arises is How did the Conservative Party strategy influence the shift in voter preference during the 2006 Canadian federal election? In tackling this issue our discussion draws upon the political marketing framework proposed by Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2006) and Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a) to examine the organizational strategies adopted by the CPC to engage with the Canadian electorate in the period between the 2004 and 2006 federal elections. Although this framework was developed as an analytical construct for examining the rise of “New” Labour in the United Kingdom during the 1990s, it has more recently been used within the international context to analyze the behaviour of political parties in different national contexts, including Austria, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Peru, Scotland, Sweden, and the United States.

Two distinguishing features underpin the Lees-Marshment framework. The first is the notion that, just as contemporary producers of goods and services need to increasingly generate customized goods/services to effectively connect with consumers, modern political parties in liberal democracies need to alter the ways in which they deliver their product offerings (e.g., party platforms, party and leader image) to their consumers (i.e., voters) to effectively connect with the electorate.

The second is the emphasis placed on organizational strategy and positioning in the political marketplace. The Lees-Marshment framework challenges the commonly held view that political marketing is primarily about tactical campaign...
issues (e.g., image advertising, branding) and the use of sales techniques during campaigns. Instead it postulates that political marketing is, fundamentally, about organizational behaviour and the design of political products. The “products” are seen to be comprised, foremost, of intangibles such as how a political party performs in terms of its leadership, Members of Parliament and candidates, membership, staff, symbols, constitution, and its activities such as party conferences and policies. Therefore, this framework is not oriented toward comparing “the selling of politics with cornflakes, to use the old cliché, but with the selling of long-term services in mature markets” (Scammell, 1999, p. 726).

Seen in this light, the political communication and, more broadly, the media strategies of political parties are understood as constituting part of a political organization’s overall market orientation. In order to illuminate the relationship between the type of organization behind campaigns and the strategies of the campaigns, the Lees-Marshment framework puts forth three—ideal—typologies to distinguish between party strategies: product-, sales- and marketing-oriented organizations.

The argument developed in the ensuing pages is that, by combining the desire of political science to understand political processes with the interest of political communication in the use of persuasive messages to reach audiences, the Lees-Marshment framework provides a useful addition to the arsenal of tools at our disposal for understanding and assessing the organizational strategies used by political parties in liberal democracies to interact with and to understand the expressed and latent desires, needs, and priorities of the electorate. The next section provides an overview of the changing dynamics of citizenship and of the foundations of the emerging field of Political Marketing. The third section presents a case study of the Conservative Party’s political marketing strategy in the period between the 2004 and 2006 elections. The focus of the case study is on the ways in which market intelligence was incorporated into and shaped the Conservative Party’s organizational strategy. The last section draws out the implications of the case study.

**Market, media, and citizen-consumers**

Domestic and international political arenas are influenced by intense social and cultural pressures that constantly challenge the conceptual frameworks developed by social scientists to analyze the domain of political communication. Maarek (1995), for example, has argued that political communication can no longer continue to rely on the rhetorical quality of the political discourse of its orators. Similarly, Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) and Blumler and Gurevitch (2000) claim that we have entered into a “third age” of political communication that is characterized by an abundance of information and consumption choices that are transforming the political domain and which require new forms of information exchange between governments and citizens.

A defining feature of this third age of political communication, according to Scammell (2003) and Bennett (n.d.), is the consolidation of a market relation between citizens and the political sphere. Echoing the views of Mouffe (1992), Bauböck (1994), and Sassen (2002), they suggest that the expansion of competition and choice in the provision of, and access to, information services has altered
the landscape of citizenship such that it is no longer realized only in people’s relation to the state. Elaborating on this phenomenon, Scammell (2003, p. 15) argues:

Clearly, there are parallels in the development of consumer and political markets. Just as the consumer is empowered through increased choice and vastly expanded resources of information, so too is the political consumer. Political interest options and resources await our convenience in astonishing abundance. . . . The political consumer is increasingly the hunter rather than the hunted. In politics as in commerce there is a shift in the balance of market power from the producers to the consumers.

The result, she claims, is a convergence of citizenship and consumerism in the North American and European contexts and a reshaping of citizens into a political “audience” that now asserts its structural power on the basis of a consumerist mantle instead of class. The empowerment of citizens under this mantle, she further argues, is observable in the growing demands for more direct, and better-delivered, benefits in public services that frequently are based on voter’s primary and/or short-term interests.

Within the Canadian context, the notion of political consumers is exemplified, in part, by the presence of a political environment in which it is difficult to sustain party loyalty among the electorate and in which voters tend to eschew strong ideological affiliations (Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc, & Pammett, 1996). According to Carty (2002, p. 727), the Canadian electorate’s multi-partisanship corresponds to the idiosyncrasies of the Canadian political system and context insofar as parliamentary norms call for a level of party discipline on policy and programme questions that simply make it impossible to contain all of the country’s political diversity within two parties. Regions that feel neglected and groups who think their interests are not being articulated find themselves drawn to build and support new parties.

Multiculturalism also contributes to voter instability insofar as “immigration has added a higher proportion of voters with no established party ties to the electorate than in any other established democracy” (Carty, 2002, p. 727). It also may be argued that the reshaping of citizens into a political audience within the Canadian context is evidenced by the propensity for the short-term forces associated with valence issues and leader images to play such a prominent role in voters’ decision-making (Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau, & Nevitte, 2002; Clarke et al., 1996; Clarke, Kornberg, & Wearing, 2000). In light of this situation, Canadian political parties must contend with finding ways to communicate effectively with diverse and irregular supporters who often are animated by the interests and demands of their distinctive communities, regions, and cultural groups.

Advertising and selling techniques have long been incorporated into the modus operandi of political communication (Butler & Collins, 1994; Hacker & Swan, 1992; Kern, 1989). This may help to explain why political marketing is commonly equated with elections, advertising techniques, and, more broadly, the media strategies employed by political organizations in the quest for electoral mandates (Scammell, 1999). Niffenegger (1989), for example, has argued that the implementation of marketing strategies in the political domain is a process aimed
at offering a more effective and efficient means of designing and implementing
political campaigns. In line with this view, Maarek (1995) conceptualizes politi-
cal marketing as a complex process that encapsulates advertising, message
design, public opinion polls, positioning, and branding. O’Cass (1996) similarly
argues that, while political marketing cannot ensure electoral success, “it does
offer improved performance, and more appropriate ways of making decisions and
managing campaigns” (p. 40).

Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2006) and Lilleker & Lees-Marshment
(2005a), by contrast, call for a merging of political communication’s traditional
concern with elections, advertising techniques, and media strategy, with a focus
on the behaviour of political organizations during and between elections. Expanding
on this view, Lees-Marshment (2001a, p. 701) points out that

[c]ampaign studies suggest the importance of campaigns; political com-
communication and media studies highlight the role of long-term communi-
cation. The political marketing process connects these strands together
with the two stages of communication and campaign; it also brings
together market intelligence, product design and communication, which
previous party models have sometimes neglected to do.

In line with this view, Strömbäck (2007) asserts that when it comes to political-
marketing,

the important question facing political parties in different countries is not
whether to conduct product-, sales- or market-oriented campaigns. The
important question is whether to be a product-, sales- or market-oriented
organization. (p. 81)

According to this perspective, then, the political marketing process is about
political parties conducting market intelligence to “identify citizen concerns,
change their behaviour to meet these demands, and communicate their ‘product
offering’ more effectively” to the electorate (Lees-Marshment, 2001a, p. 692). At
issue here is whether and/or how market intelligence is used by political parties
to inform the design and implementation of political products.

While mainstream marketing offers a framework for understanding voter and
political party behaviour, there is a need for caution when assessing its direct
applicability to the political domain. Lock and Harris (1996), for example, iden-
tify a number of important differences between conventional purchase choice and
electoral choice settings that highlight discrepancies between marketing in com-
mercial and political domains. These differences relate to:

• Costs—There is no price directly or indirectly attached to voting.
  Therefore, budgetary constraints do not prevent the casting of votes;
• Benefits—Individual voters have to live with the decision of the col-
  lective, even though that decision may not reflect one’s individual
  preference;
• The intangibility of the political product; and
• The distinction between public choice issues and consumer mar-
  kets—electoral choice and conventional purchase are affected by
different standards, timings, and consequences.
In addition, directly equating voters/citizens with consumers is a dubious proposition. Scammell (1999), for example, notes that equating voters with consumers automatically portrays them as being passive when this not necessarily the case. Likewise, O’Shaughnessy (2001) warns that “reliance on commercially derived political marketing techniques to win elections helps undermine the role of active participation in politics today, to the future detriment of those who employ them” (p. 1052).

Despite these concerns, the development of benchmarking tools and analytical models has been a driving force underlying much political marketing research that is aimed at assessing the effects of marketing in politics (Bartle & Griffiths, 2002). For example, Newman’s (1994) study of the ways in which presidential candidates are marketed to voters in the United States brought together marketing and political campaign concepts to create a model that integrates the marketing campaign, the political campaign, candidate focus, and environmental forces into a political marketing model. He postulated that the exchange process in politics was rooted in “a candidate, who offers political leadership in exchange for a vote from the citizen” (Newman, 1994, p. 10).

![Figure 1: The Lees-Marshment framework](source: Lilleker & Lees-Marshment (2005a, p. 8).)

According to Newman, successfully completing this exchange required political organizations to simultaneously coordinate a marketing and political campaign. While he viewed the “marketing campaign” as manifest throughout the “political campaign,” he did not specify which dimension of the marketing cam-
campaign (e.g., voter segmentation, candidate positioning, strategy formulation, and implementation) corresponds to each stage of a political campaign, or whether any one dimension is more influential than the others.

Although Newman’s model offered an important contribution to understanding how marketing techniques and concepts are and can be applied to politics, it did not address the issue of market orientation. Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b) and Lilleker & Lees-Marshment (2005a), on the other hand, have set out a political marketing framework that distinguishes between three—ideal-type—categories of market orientation as a basis for investigating the evolution of political parties’ orientation toward the electorate (see Figure 1). Each of the categories is defined by a series of marketing stages that are undertaken to interact with voters. The three categories of market orientation are as follows:

1. Product-Oriented Party (POP): Political parties falling into this category are characterized as being strongly tied to specific convictions that they stand by and argue for. POPs do not actively gather or use market intelligence in the design or communication of their product offering. The underlying assumption guiding the overall marketing strategy of POPs is that voters will recognize the merit of the party’s ideas and, therefore, will vote for it. In other words, POPs lobby for voter support on the grounds that the ideology they represent is normatively valuable and/or is the correct way of proceeding. Moreover, they adhere to their product offering even if it fails to garner widespread support.

2. Sales-Oriented Party (SOP): Political parties falling into this category are characterized as seeking to persuade voters of the value of their product offerings through the gathering and use of extensive communication-related market intelligence that is founded on an understanding of how markets can be manipulated. The emphasis here is on research for advertising and message design (i.e., product presentation), but not on the design of the party’s product offering per se. As such, SOPs parallel POPs insofar as they do not significantly change or alter their ideas/platforms to suit what people want. They differ from POPs, however, in terms of using market intelligence to determine how to persuade voters that they want the product offering the party is selling.

3. Market-Oriented Party (MOP): Political parties falling into this category are characterized as actively engaging in attempts to identify and to incorporate voters’ priorities and concerns into their product offerings before actually designing these offerings. The essence of the MOP strategy rests on using “various tools to understand and then respond to voter demands, but in a way that integrates the need to attend to members’ needs, ideas from politicians and experts and the realities of governing, and to focus more on delivering and making a difference than employing sales techniques to persuade or manipulate opinion” (Lees-Marshment, 2006, p. 122). As shown in Figure 1, the marketing strategy of MOPs involves eight distinct stages and is much more complex than that used by POPs and SOPs. Throughout each of these stages market intelligence
is used to inform and to define the demands that will be used to build and communicate an MOP’s product offering to voters.

With the exception of Marland (2003, 2005a, 2005b), there have been relatively few studies examining the strategies of Canadian political parties through a marketing lens. Marland (2003) illustrated the ways in which marketing tools and techniques (e.g., comparative advertising, direct mail, Internet campaigning, robo-calls) are implemented and used in the Canadian electoral environment. He argues that in spite of the growing use of political consultants, Canadian federal election campaign activities “are relatively static,” with spin control, advertising, broadcasted debates, media relations, and party leaders’ tours being the pivotal electoral campaign activities (Marland, 2003, p. 7). Nonetheless, Marland claims that political marketing—in the Lees-Marshment sense of the term—is an increasingly common phenomenon within the Canadian political context and is directly proportional to the change in Canadian parties’ orientation toward the electorate.

Building on his earlier work, Marland’s (2005a, 2005b) studies of the 2000 and 2004 Canadian federal elections revealed that the characteristic features of Marketing-Oriented Parties (MOPs) were not widely identifiable among Canadian political parties during either campaign, and that the market intelligence gathered by the parties was not strongly embedded into their core strategies. His findings show that with the exception of the Bloc Québécois, which adopted a Product-Oriented (POP) approach, the characteristics of Sales-Oriented Parties (SOPs) were the most prevalent during both campaigns, with marketing techniques being “used predominantly for communications (rather than product) decisions” (Marland, 2005a, p. 63). This suggests that instead of using marketing intelligence to identify voter needs and to design party platforms (i.e., being market-oriented), the marketing efforts of Canadian political parties during these campaigns focused mainly on selling or persuading voters of the value of the respective products they had on offer (i.e., being selling-oriented).

The next section assesses how, and the extent to which, the Conservative Party may be characterized as having moved toward adopting and implementing a market-oriented approach for engaging with the Canadian electorate in the lead-up to and during the 2006 federal election.

The 2006 Canadian federal election

For our purposes, two salient features characterize the outcome of the 2006 federal election. First, the Conservative Party was led to victory by Stephen Harper, the same individual who had led the party during its 2004 election defeat. Second, the Liberals lost the election despite having entered the 2006 campaign with a commanding lead in the polls (Clarke et al., 2006; Nodice, 2007).

A central communication question that arises is How did the Conservative Party strategy influence the shift in voter preference during the 2006 Canadian federal election? In order to address this issue, the discussion presented in this section is structured in accordance with the eight marketing stages that characterize MOPs. Our objective here is twofold. First, we aim to profile the marketing activities of the CPC to identify whether and/or the extent to which it may be seen as having followed the marketing stages characteristic of MOP strategy between
the 2004 and 2006 federal elections. The second objective is to assess the efficacy of the Lees-Marshment framework within the Canadian political context.

**Stage 1: Market intelligence**

According to the Lees-Marshment framework, the first stage in the market-oriented approach is characterized by the gathering and analyzing of market intelligence to inform internal (e.g., a common agreement in a less right-wing policy platform) and external (e.g., policy communication, image, and party advertising) changes in party behaviour. It is standard practice in political parties, and has been for many years, that campaign materials are evaluated by members of the voting public through public opinion research and focus groups that test the appeal of draft messages and products. What distinguishes product-, sales-, and marketing-oriented parties is if, when, and how the information gathered from this process is used in the design and implementation of political products.

As was noted in the previous section, POPs tend to make little use of market intelligence in designing their product offerings. SOPs, on the other hand, make extensive use of market intelligence for the purposes of product presentation as opposed to the actual design of their product offerings. For MOPs, however, the gathering and analysis of market intelligence “aims to discover voter’s behaviour, needs, wants, and priorities” and to understand public concerns and demands before attempting to design a product offering that reflects these interests (Lilleker & Lees-Marshment, 2005a, p. 10). The distinguishing feature of MOPs, then, is that unlike POPs and SOPs, their use of market intelligence is seen to extend to virtually all aspects of product design and implementation.

Given the newness of the Conservative Party at the time of the 2004 election, it had not yet established a unified voice or developed a coordinated policy platform before Canadians went to the polls (Cross, 2007; Cross & Young, 2003). Instead, the party was characterized by a makeshift amalgamation of Canadian Alliance–Reform and Progressive Conservative cultures. Among other things, this allowed the Liberals to portray the new party and its leader as being incapable of running an efficient government and of holding a right-wing “hidden agenda” (Clarke et al., 2005; Rose, 2004).

In the aftermath of its 2004 election defeat, the Conservative Party began a process of reconstruction (Ellis & Woolstencroft, 2006; Marzolini, 2006). The bulk of the Conservative Party’s work in this domain consisted of the gathering and analysis of market intelligence to inform the development of a policy platform that sought to reflect the concerns and priorities of specific segments of the electorate (e.g., soft conservatives and soft liberals), re-branding the party as a viable centrist option that was more accountable than the Liberals, improving the party’s media management strategies, and fostering the participation of prominent MPs in the party leader’s national campaign. Elaborating on this process, one senior-level communications advisor for the Conservative Party commented:

The Conservative Party spent a lot of time between the loss in 2004 and the election in 2006 branding itself. There were a number of things that happened. They brought on a fellow named Patrick Muttart who came from the private marketing, private opinion world. He did a lot of
research and work looking at patterns of voters and trends, and what worked and what didn’t work at many levels. (Personal communication, June 15, 2006).

These activities informed the Conservatives’ efforts at updating, defining, and communicating a more unified product offering to the Canadian voting public in the 2006 election than had been the case in 2004. In the words of Stephen Harper, “We had a complete review of what we did, what we did right or wrong and then made the appropriate changes” (quoted in Persichilli, 2006).

Although the “newness” of the Conservatives’ product offering was criticized by some as reflecting little more than a superficial modification of the policy platforms of the former Canadian Alliance and Progressive Conservative parties, the basic MOP approach of responding to the electorate by implementing market-oriented changes appears to have been adopted by the Conservative Party and its leader during the 18 months between the 38th and 39th federal elections.

**Stage 2: Product design, and Stage 3: Product adjustment**

The Lees-Marshment framework suggests that one can distinguish between the design of a political party’s product offering (e.g., party platform, party and leader image) on the one hand and product adjustments on the other. According to this framework, MOPs design and, subsequently, adjust their product offering on the basis of market intelligence data. This can entail making changes to almost any aspect of the party’s product offering, ranging from the trivial to the very specific. Product adjustments, in turn, are seen to be influenced by four core variables:

- **Achievability**—parties should not promise what they cannot deliver, as this results in voter dissatisfaction.

- **Internal reaction analysis**—at issue here is the linking of the demands and priorities of the market with those of party members. MOPs have to strike a balance between the demands and priorities of voters and those of party members.

- **Competition analysis**—the distinctiveness of the product design is a consequence of analyzing and responding to what other political parties are offering to voters.

- **Support analysis**—this aspect of product adjustment involves identifying the key groups or segments within the market whose support is required to achieve party goals (e.g., electoral victory, winning a certain number of seats) and developing targeted aspects of the product to suit them.

While distinguishing between product design and product adjustment as unique phases in the political marketing process may provide analytical clarity, it potentially blurs realities on the ground in different institutional and cultural contexts insofar as it overlooks the fact that the two processes may actually be interdependent (Lees, 2005; Rudd, 2005, Strömbäck, 2007). For example, within the Canadian political context it would be extremely difficult to design a political product that did not correspond in some way with a political party’s core beliefs and values and which was not influenced by feedback from the public as well as comparative analyses of what other political parties were offering to voters. In
other words, political parties in Canada need to adhere, at least nominally, to some form of ideological constraint in order to help voters/citizens understand what individual parties stand for. As one senior-level Liberal Party communications advisor put it, “As cynical as people are about this, the parties do come from shared values, they do come from core beliefs, of policies that they espouse, and those things... they don’t move a lot” (personal communication, June 12, 2006).

The election of a Liberal minority government in 2004 led to uncertainty about the timing of the next federal election and meant that the Conservatives had to contend with a major dilemma in the post-election period. Ellis & Woolstencroft (2006, p. 58) aptly summarize this predicament as follows:

How then, would the Conservative Party address its identity crisis in attempting to broaden its support? How would it position itself on social issues like abortion, same sex marriage, and euthanasia? Could it successfully navigate the troubled waters of French-English relations? What role would it prescribe for the courts, especially in relation to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms? What was its vision of federalism, the role of government, and the welfare state? In the fashion of a missionary movement, would it revert to the populist, moralistic, and right-wing rhetoric of the Reform Party, one of its founders? Or would it develop more moderate and balanced positions in the manner of a broker-oriented, centre-seeking party, akin to the Progressive Conservative Party, the other part of its heritage?

In March 2005, more than one year after the party had been formed, the Conservatives held their first national policy convention, in Montréal. The meeting culminated with the release of the Conservative Party of Canada’s 2005 Policy Declaration. Although the declaration had Reform–Alliance overtones, the bulk of its contents “effectively eliminated most of the social, conservative and populist hot-button issues that allowed their opponents to label the Conservatives as extreme and accuse them of harbouring hidden agendas” (Ellis & Woolstencroft, 2006, p. 65). Some of the key changes away from the previous Reform–Alliance positions included support for not re-engaging in the abortion debate, allowing free votes in Parliament on moral issues such as euthanasia and same-sex marriage, and addressing the fiscal imbalance.

The convention proceedings and the resultant policy declaration suggest that the CPC’s shift toward becoming a pragmatic centre-right party was accepted internally, even by those members with more social conservative agendas. The unifying factor in this instance appears to have been a recognition of the importance of party unity and a desire to take the steps needed to be recognized by voters as a viable option to form the next government (Ellis, 2006; Ellis & Woolstencroft, 2006).

In addition to moving toward a more centrist position, the Conservatives were cognizant of the need to effectively communicate their new policy platform to voters. Here too market intelligence was used. First, the Conservatives analyzed the demographics of the core supporters who were the target audience for its product offerings (i.e., support analysis). This enabled the party to avoid expending efforts on seeking to attract voters who were deemed to be unattain-
able while maximizing its appeal to those who were seen to be its most receptive audience. Put simply, market intelligence was used to help develop a “campaign that could ‘narrowcast’ rather than ‘broadcast’” (Marzolini, 2006, p. 258).

Second, whereas the policy platform for the 2004 election had been overly detailed and not well aligned with the party’s communication and advertising strategies, the Montréal policy declaration was structured around five valence issues, or themes, that the party’s market intelligence–gathering exercises had identified as being of particular importance to Canadian voters—i.e., political accountability, health care, crime/security, tax relief, and child care. Indeed, four of these issues were subsequently identified by the 2006 Political Support in Canada pre-election online survey of 6,116 Canadians as being the most important issues in the 2006 election (see Figure 2). The Liberals, by contrast, entered the 2006 campaign hoping that voters would be primarily concerned with economic issues (Clarke et al., 2006; Clarkson, 2006).

![Figure 2: Issues identified as most important in the 2006 federal election](image)

Each of the five valence issues prioritized by the Conservatives were, in turn, linked to specific policies that had “the virtue of being hands-on, personally identifiable, and good for consumers rather than for corporations, public policy specialists, or newspaper editorialists” (Ellis & Woolstencroft, 2006, p. 72). In other words, the structuring of a policy platform on the basis of five valence issues that the party’s market intelligence–gathering exercises had identified as being priority areas for voters enabled the Conservatives to put forth a distinguishable policy platform that was easy to communicate and understand. The platform also
appears to have struck a balance between the demands and priorities of its target audience and those of party members.

Stephen Harper’s leadership image also underwent a major transformation in the period between the 2004 and 2006 elections. For the Conservatives, leadership image was particularly important given that the Liberals had so successfully portrayed Harper as a “scary” individual with a hidden right-wing agenda during the 2004 election (Rose, 2004, 2006). A particularly significant feature of Stephen Harper’s and the Conservatives’ image transformation was the effort made at re-branding the leader and the party in Québec, where in 2004 they had failed to win any seats. This re-branding process was closely tied to the Liberal sponsorship scandal and the subsequent Gomery Commission that had Québec at its epicentre. In light of these events, the Conservatives managed to seize upon and reinforce popular dissatisfaction with the Liberals in Québec by giving greater precedence to the Québec electorate’s concerns and by working toward improving Harper’s French-language skills. This is reflected in the observations of O’Neill (2006), who notes that “Mr. Harper began to catch on in Quebec after delivering a speech in Quebec City in which he promised ‘open federalism’ that would honour provincial autonomy, work to reduce the fiscal imbalance and allow Quebec and other provinces a greater role on the international stage.”

These efforts by the Conservatives in the lead-up to, and during, the 2006 election campaign appear to have successfully re-branded Stephen Harper’s leadership image into a new “nice guy,” “friendly” image. Commenting on this new image, Sallot (2006) noted:

Mr. Harper successfully portrayed himself and his party as the folks down the block, hockey dads, soccer moms, moderate small-c conservatives, middle class, slightly bland, definitely not scary. The makeover was so successful that many voters decided to trust the Conservatives to form a government.

The processes of product design and adjustment undertaken by the Conservatives also suggest a partial shift toward an MOP approach. To this end, the use of market intelligence to inform the design and adjustment of a product offering appears to have been an essential component in shaping the Conservatives’ policy platform in the lead-up to the 2006 campaign. The information gathered contributed to the repositioning of the Conservative Party toward a more centrist agenda and the re-branding of Stephen Harper’s leadership image in English- and French-speaking Canada. Taken together, these two factors appear to have coalesced to create a more comprehensive and cohesive product offering than had been the case in 2004.

Stage 4: Implementation

Equally important and related to the development of a product offering in any marketing effort is the process of product implementation. As Lilleker & Lees-Marshment (2005a, p. 11) point out, in the political domain this process “involves unifying the party around the proposed product.” This suggests that the variables influencing the product adjustment stage (e.g., achievability, internal reaction analysis, competition analysis, support analysis) also are likely to manifest them-
selves throughout the implementation stage because they are central to maintaining and/or fostering party cohesiveness.

Party cohesiveness is essential to convincing voters of the credibility of the product offering, because the failure of party members to engage in a common discourse can create internal problems that risk contaminating the party’s brand. This points to the importance of striking a balance between the demands and priorities of the targeted audience and those of party members throughout the implementation stages. Moreover, the specificities of the Canadian political environment (i.e., geography, bilingualism, and the parliamentary system) call for strong party harmony and internal organization to ensure the effective communication and diffusion of political parties’ product offerings throughout the country’s diverse constituencies.

According to Flanagan (2006), a senior Conservative campaign advisor for the 2006 election, Stephen Harper was keenly aware of the importance of party unity. Commenting on Harper’s recognition of the difference between a party of government and a party of influence, Flanagan writes:

Both Reform and the NDP have been famous for their outspoken members, who never hesitate to challenge the conventional wisdom, official party policy and even their leader. From the beginning Harper understood that that style would never succeed for a governing party in a parliamentary system, so he has worked to establish discipline and control, both internally over staff, caucus and cabinet and externally over media relations. (Flanagan, 2006, p. 83)

The adoption of a more cohesive and disciplined approach to delivering the party’s message after the 2005 Montréal convention marked a substantive difference from the communication processes that had characterized the Conservatives’ actions throughout the 2004 campaign. This change appears to have enabled Conservative electoral candidates to more effectively focus on the main elements of the party’s platform and to communicate similar messages to their constituencies prior to and throughout the 2006 election campaign. By contrast, during the 2004 campaign the Conservatives had problems with candidates going off message. For example, the accusations made by some candidates that prime minister Paul Martin was soft on child pornography along with the voicing of other inflammatory and socially conservative messages served to detract attention from the Conservatives’ message. It also provided fodder for the Liberals’ claims that Harper was not trustworthy (Clarke et al., 2005; Clarke et al., 2006; Ellis & Woolstencroft, 2006).

Gaining sufficient credibility among the electorate to be seen as a viable option to form the government was one of the Conservative Party’s greatest challenges in the lead-up to the 2006 election. This activity is a particularly important facet of the MOP approach, because it is “only when an overall majority of the party members, candidates and MPs broadly accept the logic of the market-oriented product will voters be convinced of the credibility of what the party has on offer” (Lilleker & Lees-Marshment, 2005a, p. 11). The Conservatives appear to have succeeded in gaining this credibility, in large part, due to a combination of factors, some of which were not under their control.
In terms of credibility enhancing factors beyond the party’s control, the Conservatives benefited from a number of extenuating circumstances that contributed to a shift in public opinion to the Conservatives by raising questions about the Liberals’ credibility and track record as the party in government. First, the release of the Gomery Commission Report in early November 2005 ensured that the Liberal sponsorship scandal would once again be a focal election issue. Although the report’s findings concluded that Prime Minister Paul Martin had not personally engaged in any wrongdoing, the revelations regarding the scope of irregularities and mismanagement of the sponsorship program identified a “culture of entitlement” among prominent Liberals and bureaucrats involved with the program.

Further doubts were raised about the accountability of the Liberals in December 2006, in the middle of the 2006 election campaign, with the announcement of an RCMP criminal investigation into suspicious trading patterns on the Toronto Stock Exchange in the hours preceding an announcement by the Liberal finance minister, Ralph Goodale, on November 23, 2005, that there would be no change in the tax rules governing income trust investments. Combined with the Gomery findings, the income trust affair served to reinforce the notion that there was serious corruption within the Liberal ranks.

A third noteworthy event from which the Conservatives appear to have benefited serendipitously was the “beer and popcorn” comments made by Scott Reid, the Liberals’ director of communications, on CBC Television during a panel discussion in the early stages of the election campaign. Responding to the Conservatives’ plan to give families with young children $1,200 a year for child care, Reid said, “Don’t give people 25 bucks a week to blow on beer and popcorn . . . . Give them child-care spaces that work” (quoted in “Liberal Apologizes,” CBC, 2005). Shortly after making these comments, Reid was forced to issue a public apology. Taken together, the three issues outlined above contributed to a shift in public opinion toward the Conservatives insofar as they helped to crystallize the doubts and suspicions of the public over the lack of Liberal accountability.

As for the credibility enhancing factors over which the Conservatives did have control, there are three that are notable from a marketing perspective. The first centres on the success of the Conservative Party in designing specific policies that focused on valence issues that reflected the concerns and priorities of particular segments of the electorate (i.e., soft Conservatives and soft Liberals) and which did not significantly deviate from the party’s principles. Second, caucus members managed to stay on message throughout the 2006 campaign. “[D]ivisive position issues such as abortion, immigration, and same-sex marriage were sidestepped, and party ideologues were tightly muzzled” (Clarke et al., 2006, p. 819). The third key factor was the Conservatives’ media strategy. It is discussed in more detail below.

**Stage 5: Communication, and Stage 6: Campaign**

Stage 5 of the Lees-Marshment framework, Communication, centres on conveying a political party’s product offering to the electorate. This stage is seen to reflect a continuous process that facilitates interactions between internal and external supporters of the party in a coherent manner during election and non-election periods. It is followed by the Campaign, which re-iterates and empha-
sizes the most relevant aspects of the product offering for voters before they go
to the polls.

A party’s media strategy is a central component of the campaign stage and constitutes an important part of an MOP’s overall market orientation insofar as it is indicative of the way in which the party seeks to frame itself as speaking on behalf of citizens. Successfully managing this framing exercise by being market oriented is particularly crucial for political parties that have to contend with commercialized and/or competitive media systems, because doing so “can make it more difficult for journalists to criticize them and to focus on aspects of the campaigns other than those issues the parties feel are important” (Strömbäck, 2007, p. 85; see also Knuckey & Lees-Marshment, 2005; Waddell & Dornan, 2006).

Historically, within the Canadian political context most political advertising was confined to the short time frames of election campaigns. This, however, began to change in the late 1980s, when indirect campaigning began to take place outside of election periods. At issue here are the strategic manoeuvres made by a party in government that are aimed at putting it on an election footing and improving its re-election prospects before an election is called (e.g., budget speeches, cabinet shuffles, party conferences). Labelling this phenomenon “the long campaign,” Clarke et al. (1996) point out that while these types of activities easily merge with the day-to-day activities of government and tend to be less direct than the actions taken by parties during campaigns to engage the attention of the electorate, they are nonetheless aimed at affecting election outcomes. We have chosen to conflate the communication and campaign stages of the MOP approach into one, given their interconnectedness within the Canadian political context.

According to Lilleker & Lees-Marshment (2005a), if a party has recently changed its product offering, the communication stage is crucial for convincing voters that its offer is truly suitable to people’s interests. The Conservatives’ communication strategy throughout the 2006 election campaign appears to have successfully tackled this issue. A more strategic understanding of the news cycle and of how the party might best communicate its product offering accordingly was a defining characteristic of the Conservative communication strategy during this period (Clarke et al., 2006; Ellis & Woolstencroft, 2006; Waddell & Dornan, 2006).

The Conservative Party’s communication and campaign strategies were rooted in the notion that it was the party’s overall product offering that constituted its principal strength. This meant that the Conservative Party had to ensure that the diffusion of its messages was clearly directed toward voters, and furthermore that its messages were structured concisely, that they were easy to understand, and that they were communicated as efficiently as possible. Patrick Muttart played an important role in this regard, especially in terms of designing how and what messages were conveyed to the public. In the words of Ellis & Woolstencroft (2006, p. 71), “he was responsible for giving the campaign a narrative that pulled together the often disjointed aspects of abstract policy, advertising and messaging by providing a new style that reflected the party’s more moderate identity.” Fostering and maintaining this moderate image also included
the strategic decision of not “going negative” in the first weeks of the 2006 campaign, despite the accusations of corruption associated with the Liberal sponsorship scandal and, later, the income trust investigation.

The strategic decision to convey one policy announcement per day was another key feature of the Conservatives’ political communication strategy throughout the 2006 campaign. Commenting on the differences between the party’s 2004 and 2006 communication strategies in *On Campus Weekly*, Tom Flanagan pointed out:

In 2004 we didn’t communicate our platform very effectively. We thought we should put it out in larger chunks, so we released it more or less a chapter a day over a two-week period. But the media, once they have something, they’re not interested anymore, they always want something new. This time instead of a chapter a day we released a plank a day and we kept it going for almost seven weeks. (quoted in “War Room Insights,” 2006)

This approach had the added advantage of portraying the Conservatives as being policy driven, and of forcing the Liberals to continually respond to the Conservatives’ announcements rather than communicating their own proposals. Ultimately, this tactic served as a means to “seize control of the news agenda, to dominate the day-to-day coverage” (Waddell & Dornan, 2006, p. 222). As such, it was first and foremost a media management technique that appears to have successfully influenced the media coverage given to the Conservative Party. Both Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party received considerably more positive media coverage and public opinion support throughout the 2006 election than Harper’s Liberal counterpart, Paul Martin.9 It seems plausible that this too played an important role in influencing voter preferences.

**Stage 7: Election**

A key objective of the Conservative Party in the 18 months between the 2004 and 2006 elections was to broaden its appeal to the electorate. On January 23, 2006, the Conservative Party was elected to power and brought to an end 12 years of Liberal rule. Although they did not receive enough votes to form a majority government, the success of the Conservatives reflects a noteworthy turnaround in voter preference in a short period of time, as is evidenced by an almost 7% increase in their popular share of the vote when compared to the 2004 election outcome (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloc Québécois</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: Vote shares by party, 2004 and 2006**

*Source:* Elections Canada website: www.elections.ca.
Lederer, Plasser, & Scheucher (2005, p. 132) claim that “politics is always caught between leading and following the electorate.” This clearly is manifest in the ways in which the Conservative Party re-branded itself between the two elections. As Ellis & Woolstencroft (2006, p. 87) have noted, the 2006 election, ultimately, was a campaign “predicated on the belief that there was great interest in change but only if it was moderate, balanced and circumspect.” To this end, the strategies used by the Conservatives to identify and respond to the concerns of the electorate and to successfully present themselves as having the capacity to deliver such change suggest at least a partial transformation toward becoming a more market-oriented party than had been the case in 2004.

**Stage 8: Delivery**

The final marketing stage for MOPs centres on the ability of the elected party to deliver its promised product to the public while it forms the government. During this stage the ruling political party must contend with maintaining the electorate’s support and satisfying its demands. This stage, then, is particularly relevant for the Conservatives given that they came to power as a minority government and have ambitions of forming a majority government after the next federal election.

The defining feature of the Conservative Party’s product offering in the 2006 election was its short-term and personal-gain proposals (e.g., child care allowance, cut in the GST) that were aimed at appealing directly to the demands of voters. However, this in itself cannot ensure continued electoral appeal. The issue with which the Conservatives must now contend is that despite an apparent shift toward being market oriented,

in areas of economic policy, social policy, and national unity, the Conservative proposals were attractive to some but weren’t the overwhelming choice of voters. On the trust and competence factors, the public did not so much trust the Tories as distrust the Liberals. On the leadership factor, Harper’s advantage was fashioned once again in the comparative context, against a backdrop of a Liberal leader with an unappealing personal manner. (Pammett & Dornan, 2006, p. 21)

While in government, the Conservatives have had to form coalitions with the other political parties to deliver on the product they promised to the Canadian electorate. For example, the passing of the 2006 federal budget was dependent on the support of the Bloc Québécois. For the Conservatives, the continued minimizing of uncertainty among the electorate vis-à-vis their ability to deliver will be contingent upon the extent to which the party can successfully engage in similar political brokerage processes without alienating its internal supporters.

The issue that arises with regard to the Conservatives’ aspirations of forming a majority government after the next election is whether the party will be able to sustain a market orientation while in government and convince a broader range of voters that its product reflects and addresses their concerns and priorities. Sustaining a market orientation is no easy task for ruling parties, because “the business of governing may reduce the space as well as the incentive to continue to develop fully fledged market oriented policy in all its complexity” (Lilleker & Lees-Marshment, 2005b, p. 213). The comparative evidence regarding party
behaviour when in government points to a tendency for market-oriented parties to lose their connection with voters and to ebb toward becoming sales and/or product oriented (Lees-Marshment, 2006; Lilleker & Lees-Marshment, 2005a; Marland, 2005a; Ormrod, 2006). Put simply, it is easier for political parties to be market oriented when they are in opposition than when they form the government.

**Evaluating the effectiveness of political marketing**

The consolidation of a market relation between citizens and political agents is influencing the types of strategies being used by political parties in liberal democracies to more effectively interact with and understand the desires, needs, and priorities of voters/citizens. Central to these strategies has been a shift toward the identification and implementation of new methods for responding more directly to demands from an electorate that increasingly exerts its political power under a consumerist mantle. Although they have not tended to respond as rapidly to these changes as their counterparts in other countries, Canadian political parties are not exempt from this phenomenon.

This study has employed the Lees-Marshment political marketing framework to demonstrate and assess changes in the political strategy of the Conservative Party of Canada in the period between the 2004 and 2006 Canadian federal elections. According to this framework, market-oriented parties, or MOPs, are defined as seeking to obtain and understand public concerns a priori as a basis for designing their product offering (i.e., policy platform, party and leader image). In other words, MOPs do not “attempt to change what people think, but to deliver what they need and want” as identified through the gathering and analysis of market intelligence (Lilleker & Lees-Marshment, 2005a, p. 10).

The evidence from the case study suggests that this type of process can be identified, albeit to a limited degree, in the actions of the Conservative Party in the lead-up to, and during, the 2006 federal election campaign. Specific features of the adoption of a market-oriented approach were reflected in the following ways:

- designing a policy platform on the basis of input from the electorate;
- disseminating campaign messages focusing on short-term actions (e.g., cut in the GST, child-care reform, reduced health-care waiting times) and long-term policy objectives (e.g., expansion of educational programs for health professionals, new legislation regarding crime) that were not dramatically different from previous governments; and
- enhancing the cohesiveness of the party’s message delivery in a manner that minimized the likelihood of Conservative candidates going off message.

Taken together, these market-oriented actions enabled the Conservative Party to revise its product offering so as to more effectively portray itself, and to be portrayed in the mass media, as a party that was more accountable and, potentially, more credible than the governing Liberals. It may be concluded, therefore, that the Conservatives successfully managed to influence a shift in voter preference by designing and marketing a product offering that struck a balance between the interests of specific segments of the voting public (i.e., the desire for efficiency, accountability, and direct benefits without a radical ideological shift) and the interests of internal party supporters. The party’s market-oriented shift toward the
centre of the political spectrum appears to reflect, foremost, strategic considerations aimed at avoiding engagement with contentious policy considerations that appeal directly to contending social values.

Despite its apparent shift toward a more market-oriented strategy, however, the Conservatives only won a mandate to form a minority government. This raises questions about the extent to which or, indeed, whether the adoption of a market orientation can be identified as the deciding factor in the party’s 2006 election victory. Given the historical volatility of the Canadian voting public and its lack of long-term party loyalty, it must be acknowledged that the election outcome may have been little more than another strategic defeat for the Liberal Party in the wake of the findings of the Gomery Commission Report, the launching of an RCMP investigation into the income trust affair during the election campaign, and Scott Reid’s “beer and popcorn” comments. On this note, Turcotte points out that the Liberals have been “punished” by Canadians in the past (e.g., 1957, 1979, 1984), with voters electing Conservative governments when it was felt that the Liberal Party “had been in power for too long and its growing arrogance needed to be kept in check,” (2006, p. 300).

Although the Lees-Marshment framework was originally developed as an analytical tool for examining party behaviour in a different national setting (i.e., the United Kingdom), it provides a useful framework for understanding and assessing party strategy within the Canadian political environment. There are, however, some noteworthy limitations that need to be addressed. First, and as was highlighted in the case study, some of the stages identified in the framework are not as distinguishable within the Canadian context as the framework suggests. Specifically, the distinctions between the Product Design and Product Adjustment stages and the Communication and Campaign stages do not appear to hold given the electoral constraints arising from advertising regulations and campaign timing in Canada. It is important to note, however, that while the stages themselves are not as distinguishable as the framework posits, the defining features of these stages are identifiable. This finding serves to reinforce the claim that some of the processes associated with individual marketing stages may in certain institutional and cultural contexts be interdependent. As Marland has noted, this raises some concerns about the framework’s efficacy because “being fully marketing oriented is difficult. . . failing at just one or two marketing stages disqualifies a party from being an MOP,” (2005a, p. 72).

A second, and related, concern that also has been noted by Marland (2005a), Rudd (2005), Lees (2005), and Strömbäck (2007), is the potential for the Lees-Marshment framework to underestimate the complexity and dynamism of the political sphere. Put simply, the adoption and implementation of market-oriented strategies is not a panacea that ensures electoral victory. As the experience of the Conservatives in the 2006 federal election makes clear, other critical factors, such as voter volatility, cultural constraints, and political history, can be expected to exert a major influence over voter behaviour.

Third, and perhaps most problematic from a normative perspective, the Lees-Marshment framework provides little to no basis for assessing the democratic implications of political parties adopting a market orientation. Within the context of the current study, for example, it is far from clear whether the election outcome
means that the electorate is getting what it needs and wants as a result of the Conservatives having apparently become more market oriented or whether this change in party behaviour reflects, foremost, a strategy aimed at enabling the party to get what it needs and wants.

Within the Canadian context it seems plausible that the continued empowerment of voters as political consumers is likely to influence the ways in which other political parties will present their product offerings in the coming years. Two areas beckoning for empirically grounded research in this regard centre on: (i) how Web-based platforms such as Facebook and YouTube are influencing the political marketing and branding strategies of Canadian political parties; and (ii) the ways in which gender-based considerations are being developed and incorporated into the political marketing and branding strategies of Canadian political parties. With another federal election on the horizon, evaluating the effectiveness of political marketing as a means for addressing voter demands and investigating the ways in which marketing strategies are integrated into the Canadian political context are likely to remain at the forefront of ongoing research into the dynamics of Canadian political communication.

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Notes
1. For a concise overview of the key issues at stake in the 2004 Canadian federal election, see Clarke, Kornberg, MacLeod, and Scotto (2005).
2. See Lilleker & Lees-Marshment (2005a) and Strömbäck (2007).
3. Indeed, it is only since the 1993 federal election, which was marked by the beginning of the demise of the Progressive Conservative Party and the rise to prominence of the Bloc Québécois and the Reform parties, that Canada has taken on the strong appearance of a multi-party system. Previously, the Canadian political landscape had been characterized by one-party dominance with alternate periods of what was, essentially, a two-party system (Carty, Cross, & Young, 2001; Dyck, 2003).
4. Valence issues are issues that are not framed on an adversarial basis and that tend to foster political debate that “focuses on which party has the best solution to the problem or, more frequently, which party leader can most competently deal with it” (Clarke et al., 1996, p. 110). Examples include issues such as supplying affordable health care, fostering a healthy economy, ensuring political accountability.
5. Much of the advertising during the 2000 campaign consisted of negative/attack ads. This type of advertising also became a key feature of the late stages of the 2004 campaign.
6. Another important source of strategic information was informal consultations with the team behind the successful 2004 election campaign of the Conservative Australian prime minister John Howard. See Laghi (2006).
7. At issue here the distinction between political parties being market driven versus market oriented. In the case of the former, internal, competition, and support analyses may not take place as parties begin to implement changes. Consequentially, market-driven parties risk alienating their traditional supporters, are more likely to adopt policies that parallel those of their competition, and may fail to clearly delineate what they stand for ideologically. Lees-Marshment & Lilleker (2001) and Lilleker (2005) argue that the U.K. Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair exemplified a market-driven political party that managed to design a product offering that did not correspond with party beliefs.
8. Patrick Muttart is a communications consultant who was employed by Navigator Ltd., a Toronto-based research and strategy firm, before being recruited by Stephen Harper. In the 2006 federal election campaign, he worked in the war room as a senior strategist and communications specialist. After the Conservatives’ victory, he was appointed Stephen Harper’s chief of staff.

9. According to the findings of a study examining the tones of news coverage during the 2006 election, carried out by the Observatory of Media and Public Policy (OMPP) at McGill University, the Conservative Party ended the campaign with a Net Tone of 1% versus a -13% Net Tone of the Liberals. According to the OMPP methodology, the “Net tone” is measured by, first, coding the tone (positive, negative, neutral) for every mention of a party or leader in the stories of the newspapers the study coded; and, second, taking the percentage of party/leader mentions that are positive and subtracting the percentage of party/leader mentions that are negative. The measure runs from -100% (all party/leader mentions are negative) to +100% (all party/leader mentions are positive). See Blake, Maioni, and Soroka (2006) and http://media-observatory.mcgill.ca/pages/reports/OMPPElection2006(06-01-22).pdf.

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Blake, Andrew, Maioni, Antonia, & Soroka, Stuart. (2006). Just when you thought it was out, policy is pulled back in. Policy Options, 27(3), 74-79.


